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FOREWORD
This issue of the LAw QUARTERLY is devoted entirely to an analysis of
Missouri decisions relating to appellate jurisdiction. It is elementary, of
course, that, on appeal, certain cases go direct to the Supreme Court of
Missouri while others go to the appropriate Court of Appeals. The Con-
stitution of 1945 specifies the types of cases as to which the Supreme Court
"shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction."' It also provides that the
Courts of Appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals in all cases "except
appeals within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court."2 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court has frequently stated that it is a court of limited
appellate jurisdiction while the Courts of Appeal are courts of general appel-
late jurisdiction.'
This division of appellate jurisdiction stems from the Constitution of 1875
as it was amended in 1884. The purpose of creating the Courts of Appeals
and dividing appellate jurisdiction between them and the Supreme Court
was to expedite the disposition of appeals. A degree of flexibility in the dis-
tribution of case loads was provided in the constitutional provision author-
izing the legislature to change the amount in those cases where the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court is based upon the "amount in dispute."' The
equalization of work loads between the Supreme Court and the various
Courts of Appeals has been of continuing concern to the Supreme Court and
to the Missouri Bar.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has guarded its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction very carefully-not against encroachment, since this has seldom
been necessary, but against enlargement through its own process of inter-
pretation. Within the framework of the constitutional provisions, the Su-
preme Court is the final arbiter of its own appellate jurisdiction. It has exer-
cised this power with considerable restraint. The Court has said at various
times and in various ways that it must preserve its constitutional integrity
and not arrogate to itself jurisdictional authority which was not constitu-
1. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 3.
2. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 13.
3. See, e.g., Fowler v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Mo. 1963), decided
by Division Two, three members of which dissented.
4. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 3: "The supreme court shall have exclusive appellate juris-
diction ...until otherwise provided by law, in all cases where the amount in dispute,
exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of seventy-five hundred dollars."
The amount was increased to fifteen thousand dollars in 1959 by Mo. Laws 1959,
S.B. 7 (now Mo. REv. STAT. § 477.040 (1959) ).
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tionally intended.' While this approach should, in general, be commended,
it has resulted in a strict, if not restrictive, view of its own jurisdiction.
How well has the method of dividing the original, appellate jurisdiction
of cases between the Supreme and the Courts of Appeals worked in actual
practice? The discussions contained in this issue of the LAw QUARTERLY
and the examination of hundreds of decisions involving jurisdictional ques-
tions suggest that the answer to this question is "not very well." Over the
years, a substantial number of cases have been transferred between the
Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals on jurisdictional grounds.' Such
transfers involve delay and additional expense to the parties. In the aggre-
gate, they involve significant time and judicial effort which is devoted to the
decision of jurisdictional questions rather than decisions on the merits. In
some instances opinions written on jurisdictional questions indicate that the
Court studied substantial portions of the transcript before reaching a con-
clusion that it lacked jurisdiction.
In guarding its exclusive jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has developed
rules and principles which are sometimes difficult for members of the Bar to
understand and apply. At least, this would appear to be so since it is not
reasonable to assume that in most instances counsel have directed appeals to
the wrong court through ignorance, careless neglect or inadvertence. There
are some decisions in which the Court seems to have exercised jurisdiction
in order to reach the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction.'
By focusing attention on problem areas, this issue of the QUARTERLY
should encourage additional study of methods to improve the existing system
of divided jurisdiction or to devise a satisfactory substitute for it. It is obvi-
ous, of course, that if there were only one Appellate Court in Missouri to
which appeals were directed, there would be no problems of jurisdiction
such as exist now. Accordingly, it has been suggested that the Courts of
Appeals be abolished by merging them into the Supreme Court. Such a
system would contemplate a Supreme Court with divisions located at Jeffer-
son City, Kansas City, St. Louis and, possibly, Springfield. The Court en
Banc would sit at Jefferson City where the Court's administrative office
would also be located. The Court en Banc would consist of a limited rotat-
ing number of judges representing each division of the Court.
5. See, e.g., Ashbrook v. Willis, 338 Mo. 226, 228-29, 89 S.W.2d 659, 660 (1936).
6. Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 11 stipulates that want of appellate jurisdiction is not ground
for dismissal but the proceeding shall be transferred to the appellate court having juris-
diction.
Prior to the adoption of the present Constitution such transfers were directed by
statute. See Mo. Laws 1885, at 121.
7. E.g., Fowler v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1963).
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This is but one of several possible approaches. Certainly, it should be
possible to improve, in some way, the existing system. This is a problem
which should challenge the attention of the Bench and the Bar.
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